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1. Introduction and Background 
In recent years, public sector funding, in general, and for the support of activities in developing 
countries, in particular, has become more and more ‘results’ and ‘performance’ oriented. The 
Governing Instrument of the recently established Green Climate Fund (GCF),
1
 for example, tasks the 
GCF Board with establishing ‘a framework for the monitoring and evaluation of performance … of 
activities supported by the Fund’ and approving a ‘results measurement framework with guidelines 
and appropriate performance indicators’. 
There are different methods by which performance can be ‘indicated’ (or even ‘measured’) in this 
context. The World Bank, for example, uses Country Performance Ratings which are based on its 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and country implementation performance indices 
based on its Annual Report on Portfolio Performance. In the CPIA, countries are assessed with respect 
to 16 different criteria in terms of a largely qualitative 6-level ranking.
2
 The focus of this brief, 
however, is on activities that are associated with quantitative performance indicators, i.e. performance 
assessed in terms of measured quantities − such as tonnes (of carbon), kWh, or hectares − as carried 
out by the private sector.  
The aim of this brief is to review options for the use of such Quantity-Performance (QP) instruments 
as a way of channelling public funds to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective way. QP 
instruments reward quantified mitigation performance, typically measured in tonnes of CO2-
equivalent of achieved emissions reductions.
3
 As such, they imply exactly the kind of results 
monitoring that the current trend in public funding demands. They could be used by governments or 
multilateral funds, such as the Green Climate Fund, to mobilize the private sector and private sector 
finance for mitigation activities in developing countries.
4
 
QP instruments could provide a valuable complement to other well-known funding instruments for 
private sector mitigation activities in developing countries, such as ex ante public sector funding of 
projects and programmes, as well as ex post policy-driven market mechanisms, such as the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). QP instruments are, as it were, a mixture of these two alternatives, 
combining the use of public funding with ex post payments for emissions reductions.
5
  
Like traditional ex ante funding modalities, QP instruments are based on public sector finance, which 
is not the case for market mechanisms such as the CDM. Accordingly, the capacity of these QP 
                                                     
1
 Annexed to UNFCCC Decision 3/CP.17 (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf#page=2) 
2
 For a review of these indicators, see Müller (forthcoming). 
3
 Such instruments can also be applied to kilowatt-hours of renewable generation or other outcomes where each 
quantified unit is equivalent to one another in terms of environment or social benefit. 
4
 This focus on mobilizing private sector finance is not meant to minimize the use of public funds for other uses 
such as in supporting (sectoral) NAMAs or allocating resources to National Funding Entities. Performance-
based financing may well have a role in those areas as well. Norway has recently submitted that ‘Result-based 
financing, in the form of payments for verified emissions reductions at the sector- level relative to a baseline, 
has the potential to incentivize governments to create an improved environment for commercial investments and 
needs to be explored’(Norway 2012). Müller, Fankhauser, and Forstater (forthcoming) will be discussing the use 
of QP instruments in resource allocation methodologies. 
5
 There have been parallel developments in healthcare, with initiatives broadly categorized under ‘Payment by 
Results’. The World Bank’s portal on results-based financing for health (www.rbfhealth.org/rbfhealth/) offers a 
range of case studies. Broadly, PBR approaches could include cash-on-delivery aid, output-based aid, and 
prizes. Of these, output-based aid would be similar to QP instruments, as the financing flows from the donor (or 
the public sector fund) to the service provider (or the vendor reducing emissions). Payments are made only 
when the health service is delivered or emissions are reduced. 
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instruments will depend on the predictability and adequacy of the relevant public sources.
6
 At the 
same time, QP instruments may well motivate contributors to increase their levels of commitment, 
knowing that funds will be spent only for delivered reductions. Also, by providing transparent 
accounting for mitigation investments, project investors might realize further benefits from a positive 
environmental association. 
Like the CDM, QP instruments involve ex post rule-based ‘payments for performance’. Compared 
with traditional ex ante public sector funding, this can be seen as a devolution of decision-making to 
the relevant private sector entities, with clearer incentives to deliver emissions reductions but also a 
concomitant performance risk transfer.
7
 It is possible to use allocation mechanisms (such as 
auctioning) that make QP instruments, in principle, more cost-effective than ex ante alternatives. 
Conceptually, one could imagine QP instruments with or without ex ante contracting. That is, they 
could involve ex post purchasing of achieved reductions with or without a vendor being assured of the 
sale ex ante. We focus on the case of ex ante contracting because it is clearer to us, at this time, 
whether and how such instruments will create incentives for mitigation activities.
8
   
As the CDM has shown, cost-effectiveness may not achieve certain distributional goals:
9
 The 
financial flows generated have been famously ‘geographically imbalanced’, with the top four host 
countries generating more than nine-tenths of all credits.
10
 It could be argued that this imbalance is not 
‘unfair’ because the over-arching purpose of the CDM is to deliver emissions reductions to the market 
at the lowest price. However, such a singular purpose is unlikely to succeed in the case of public-
sector funded QP instruments, particularly if the funds in question are seen as shared resources for all 
developing countries. 
In order to avoid a conflict between fairness and cost-effectiveness, public sector QP instruments may 
well have to involve some form of ex ante allocation ensuring a geographic and/or sectoral balance 
among potential recipients prior to applying the QP instruments within each region and/or sector.
 
We 
will revisit this issue in Section 5. First, we will focus on QP instruments themselves and describe 
their common characteristics, before looking at various forms of QP-based funding tools, and then 
evaluating their relative merits. 
  
                                                     
6
 Generally, we would expect contributions to occur before QP contracts are written. However, if there were 
uncertainties in the funds available to pay for emissions reduction activities, especially if payouts were expected 
to occur over several years, this could dissuade vendors from committing to invest in the activities. 
7
 Traditionally, but not exclusively, ex ante project funding is tied to the project cost and not the project yield in 
term of emissions reduced. The performance risk – that the project will deliver the promised emissions 
reductions – is with the public funder, which is why a project proposal evaluation is crucial to minimize that 
risk. Yet, once funded, the incentive to deliver is dramatically reduced. By paying for delivery, there is less need 
for project evaluation, as project hosts have the incentives to deliver emissions reductions. 
8
 Without such ex ante contracting, vendors must invest in mitigation activities without any guarantees. Without 
any guarantees, the incentive for mitigation is less clear. 
9
 Cost-effectiveness may also not be aligned with other, non-distributional goals. In particular, countries may be 
concerned about non-climate-related social and environmental impacts of mitigation projects. After such 
impacts are identified, it is relatively straightforward to adjust the QP instrument to address them. 
10
 ‘Certified Emissions Reductions issued by host countries’, 893m, as at 23 March 2012: China (60%); India 
(15%); South Korea (9%); Brazil (7%).  
See http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Issuance/CERsIssuedByHostPartyPieChart.html 
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2. QP instruments defined and commonalities 
Quantity-Performance instruments come in various guises, but they all share a common characteristic: 
they provide ex post financial support based on verified emissions reductions. As such, they have the 
potential for cost-effective allocations of public funds, providing incentives for eligible recipients of 
public sector funds to supply as much (quantity) verified reduction as possible. 
Like the CDM, and other crediting mechanisms from deforestation pilot projects to voluntary 
crediting systems, QP instruments presuppose that emissions reductions (or other quantifiable 
outcomes) are well-defined and measurable − that there are agreed-upon and generally accepted 
measurement, reporting, and verification methodologies. This means that QP instruments are only 
applicable to mitigation activities where such measurement is possible. In these cases, implementation 
may be accelerated by borrowing methodologies from existing programmes such as the CDM. Other 
types of public funding instruments would be required for other mitigation activities. In some cases, 
public investment in capacity building and institutional development could remove barriers where 
QP-based instruments are not (currently) feasible. 
Moreover, certain reductions may be excluded even if the quantity is verified. QP instruments may 
contain supplemental eligibility criteria. These could be geographical (such as only considering 
reductions from LDCs), thematic (for example no nuclear, large-scale hydro, etc.) or socio-economic 
(such as being additional, or having certain sustainable development co-benefits).  
Certification of reductions – in other words, the verification of the amount reduced and the assessment 
of whether these supplemental criteria are fulfilled – can be designed at different levels of 
thoroughness. A thorough certification will typically require considerable time and effort and may 
create uncertainty for project developers about the eventual outcome. Alternatively, certification can 
be designed for speed, processing as many projects as possible with less attention to outcomes and 
supplemental eligibility criteria. While in some cases the outcomes and eligibility are unambiguous 
and can be evaluated quickly, many, if not most, cases involve such a trade-off. The decision of how 
to balance the desire for both speed and accurate evaluation will be one of the key decisions in the 
design of a QP instrument, particularly with the goal of attracting the private sector while 
simultaneously safeguarding public funds.
11
 
The use of contracted ex post payments for verified emissions reductions places a financial incentive 
squarely on the emission outcome. But that is only half the recipe for cost-effectiveness. The other 
half is a competitive allocation process, typically some kind of auction. This type of competition 
encourages vendors to reveal the emissions reductions they are willing to supply at different prices. 
Funders then sort vendors to maximize tonnes of emissions reduced, given a limited budget.  
Technically, such a system is often arranged as a ‘procurement’ or ‘reverse’ auction, where sellers bid 
rather than buyers. That is, mitigation vendors write out bids that stipulate the emissions reductions 
they are willing to provide at a particular price, and submit them to the funders without telling other 
vendors. Vendor projects must meet the appropriate eligibility criteria, which should be designed to 
                                                     
11
 In cases such as restrictions of geographical origin, the certification effort required may be negligible. In the 
case of socio-economic conditions, this may not be the case, although in the case of additionality, it may be 
possible to incorporate the basis for evaluation in the very base line used for quantity verification (see Müller 
2009). But generally this will not be possible. 
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ensure that there is the capability, technology, and experience to deliver the promised emissions 
reductions. Vendors who offer to sell reductions at lower prices will win the reverse auction.
12
  
Alternatively, funders can write contracts to buy reductions at a fixed price and then sell those 
contracts to vendors through a normal auction. Assuming reductions are profitable at the fixed price 
offered by the funders, vendors will bid to buy the contracts. In the auction, vendors write out bids 
specifying how much they will pay for such contracts and submit them to the funders (again, without 
telling other vendors). Vendors who offer to pay more for the contracts will win this regular auction. 
Both systems lead vendors to compete with each other for limited public funds and create incentives 
for cost-effectiveness so as to maximize verifiable mitigation.
13
 
An auction (of either type) need not be the only step in the allocation process. It is possible to narrow 
down and focus the scope of auctioned QP instruments by imposing eligibility constraints on the 
emissions reductions – in other words, only considering reductions from certain sources (countries, 
project types, etc.) – without jeopardizing the cost-effectiveness within that given scope. After 
defining the scope, the funder is no longer involved in decisions about specific projects. In this way, 
an auctioned QP instrument creates an automatic and transparent funding mechanism once the scope 
and eligibility are established and the public funds have been secured: there is no further approval of 
strategies, plans or project proposals by the funder, enabling vendors the utmost freedom in how to 
supply eligible emissions reductions.
14
 
While auctions do not need to be used with QP instruments, other, non-competitive, allocations of QP 
instruments are unlikely to be as cost-effective or as transparent. Given a collection of mitigation 
vendors, where each is willing to undertake quantifiable mitigation activities in exchange for some 
funding, how could one decide who to fund if not through an auction?  
Funding could be provided on a first-come, first-served basis until the resources are expended (this is 
sometimes referred to as a ‘derby’), as implemented in the Clean Technology Fund and proposed for 
the Prototype Methane Financing Facility (PMFF).
15
 In case of the PMFF, existing valuation criteria – 
in particular, CDM – would have played a large role in selecting projects, especially in the early 
stages. Even there, however, applications would largely have been reviewed and approved on a first-
come, first-served basis. Besides first-come, first-served, one could, for example, also hold a lottery 
among eligible projects to rank them, and then fund them in the order determined by the lottery until 
the resources are expended.  
Both of these approaches would be transparent, but not cost-effective, as less expensive opportunities 
could be left unfulfilled. One could ask mitigation vendors to apply for funding; funders could then 
review the applications and choose who to fund (ex post). If the only criterion is cost, this would be 
                                                     
12
 As noted earlier, the reverse auctions could be either for direct emissions reductions or for kilowatt-hours of 
clean energy, with the emissions reductions counted implicitly. 
13
 That is, assuming no collusion or other anti-competitive behaviours, the format would maximize verified 
emissions reductions relative to other forms of fund disbursement. The auction format could even go a step 
further and be designed to elicit truthful revelation of underlying costs by private sector entities and project 
developers (Montero 2008). 
14
 This is a significant benefit in terms of administrative cost to funders. A QP approach outsources project 
certification to bodies like the CDM EB and outsources project selection to the private sector. This means a 
large quantity of public finance can be managed by a small team. Of course, should the number of projects 
increase significantly, the CDM EB will also need commensurate capacity to verify emissions reductions and 
certify projects. 
15
 Methane Blue Ribbon Panel (2009). 
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equivalent to an auction; if other criteria are used, it would not be cost-effective. In any case, it would 
probably be less transparent for vendors.  
In considering possible vendors, one may have in mind (private sector) project developers or 
sovereign countries, for example through National Climate Change Trust Funds (National Funding 
Entities). One could also imagine national entities themselves utilizing QP instruments rather than 
international funds. That is, having received funds through a resource allocation process,
16
 national 
entities would then use QP instruments to mobilize the (domestic) private sector for reducing 
domestic emissions. Such an approach could have the advantage of allowing a more direct alignment 
of national objectives and QP funding (although this could also be accomplished through certification 
criteria or domestic policy choices). 
Emission markets may or may not play a role in QP instruments, depending on the QP design and 
whether markets do, in fact, emerge. QP instruments can be designed so that public sector funds 
become the catalyst for reductions ultimately delivered into a market, if and when an emission market 
is ready. In that case, QP instruments can contribute to substantial reductions in risk to vendors, 
associated with unexpectedly low carbon prices.
17
  
Alternatively, QP instruments can be designed to buy verified reductions without regard to the 
existence of an emission market. While the catalyst approach would allow QP instruments to leverage 
more verified reductions as targeted by the instruments’ defined scope, the non-market approach 
would keep mitigation supported by emission markets separate from activities incentivized by public 
funds. The important point is that QP instruments can be used to distribute public funds cost-
effectively in the context of achieving verified emissions reductions within a defined scope of 
eligibility, whatever one’s views about markets might be. 
Regardless of their relation to an offset market, QP instruments shift much of the performance risk for 
delivering certifiable reductions from funders to vendors, when compared to traditional ex ante public 
funding mechanisms. Traditional funding mechanisms require a careful and time-consuming initial 
vetting process before distributing funds, and then depend on the project developers to deliver their 
promised emissions reductions. If they do not perform, the public funders lose. In this way, funders 
hold much of the performance risk. 
By contrast, QP instruments forego much of the initial vetting but do not pay out unless the (certified) 
reductions are delivered. In this way, most of the performance risk is shifted from the funder to the 
vendor. Making payment contingent on delivery creates added incentives for vendors to succeed.     
Even with QP instruments, when a vendor fails to deliver on contracted reductions, public funds are 
tied up in anticipation of delivery. This can frustrate both funders and other vendors.
18
 Different QP 
variations can address this type of non-performance differently. We will revisit this question at the 
end of Section 4. 
  
                                                     
16
 As will be argued in Müller, Fankhauser, and Forstater (forthcoming), (multilateral) resource allocation to 
National Funding Entities could itself involve QP-instruments.  
17
 Note that in this case, the public funding subsidized what turned out to be more expensive developing country 
mitigation options than the market ultimately delivered. Public funding will never match private sector funding, 
be large enough to impact the market price, or affect the cost to developed country buyers. 
18
 This phenomenon has been documented in a variety of reverse auctions of direct purchase instruments for 
renewable power (Wiser 2002; Council on Energy, Environment and Water, and Natural Resources Defense 
Council 2012; see Box 1). 
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3. QP Variations 
Proposals for various QP-based funding instruments range widely in their design – frequently in the 
way in which they expect to interact with a prospective carbon market. Three have featured 
prominently in climate finance debates thus far, and each itself having a number of variants (though 
all with the defining feature of QPs generally – their potential to deliver cost-effective emissions 
reductions within a defined scope). 
A. Direct purchase 
The simplest QP instruments are based on the direct purchase of verified reductions by the funder. 
That is, the funder would offer to buy reductions at a specified price with a given pool of public funds. 
Determining who gets to sell the reductions at what price is the question of allocation. One cost-
effective way to allocate – that is, to achieve the most reductions with the given pool of public funds – 
is a ‘procurement’ or ‘reverse’ auction. The funder would solicit bids from vendors who specify the 
amount they are willing to supply at what price. The funder then chooses the bids with the lowest 
prices as the winning bids (Edwards 2010). Funders might be National Funding Entities or the Green 
Climate Fund; vendors could be private sector project developers.
19
 
Much work has been done on the exact details of designing such auctions – such as how bidding is 
conducted and how much the winning bids are paid.
20
 Additionally, the terms of the auction must also 
be considered, including eligibility, when the emissions reductions associated with winning bids must 
be delivered, and any penalties or consequences for failure to deliver the emissions reductions from a 
winning bid (referred to as ‘non-performance’). Reverse auctions have been used to select project 
developers under India’s National Solar Mission and have been responsible for a sharp decline in the 
per unit cost of solar power (see Box 1). 
Other allocations are possible, though most will not encourage cost-effectiveness. For example, 
reductions could be bought through discretionary ‘purchases’, where the funder chooses a group of 
vendors to fund and agrees to pay them a certain price per unit of eligible reductions (with an upper 
quantity limit). By choosing a limited number of vendors and an upper quantity limit, funders are 
assured they will have enough funds. However, since the vendors and the price are not chosen through 
an open and transparent competition, it is difficult to achieve a cost-effective outcome. 
Direct purchase instruments do not presuppose the existence of carbon markets, simply the existence 
of an agreed system to measure reductions or other units of action (such as kilowatt-hours of 
renewable power generation). If reductions take place in the context of a carbon market, where such 
emissions reductions are potential credits valid for compliance purposes, purchased reductions could 
be cancelled or retired, or eventually resold into the market.
21
 Both approaches would provide an 
immediate catalyst for emissions reduction projects; retirement would improve the environmental 
outcome, while resale would make scarce public funds available for other purposes. 
  
                                                     
19
 One variation on this instrument is the direct purchase mechanism that underlies the Amazon Fund (Zadek, 
Forstater, and Polacow, 2010). In that programme, donors have agreed to pay the host country for reduced 
emission from deforestation below an agreed baseline over a specified horizon. 
20
 For examples, see Ausubel (2002) and Milgrom (2004). 
21
 Müller and Ghosh (2008). Cancelled or retired credits will not enter a carbon market for compliance purposes. 




Box 1: India’s National Solar Mission – applying reverse auctions to discover prices and level the 
playing field 
The Indian government launched the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission in January 2010 to galvanize 
a nascent solar market with the aim of deploying 20 GW of grid-connected and 2 GW of off-grid solar power 
by 2022. One of the key features of the Mission is the use of reverse auctions to select technically qualified 
projects at the lowest per unit cost of solar electricity. Reverse auctions have two main benefits. They allow 
government procurers to select projects based on lowest cost (thereby keeping the burden on fiscal resources 
and taxpayers low) and they ensure that a price-based selection process would be transparent and fair.  
So far, two rounds of bidding have taken place for a total of 1000 MW of grid-connected capacity. For the 
first round of bidding, the government set the maximum reverse auction price at Rs.17.91/kWh ($0.45/kWh) 
but the lowest bid price dropped to Rs.12/kWh ($0.32/kWh). During the second round, the reverse auction 
was even more aggressive, with the lowest winning bid at Rs.7.49/kWh ($0.15/kWh) for a 5 MW plant, a 51 
per cent discount on the maximum reverse auction price for the second round. 
Projects selected based on lowest-priced bids are offered feed-in tariffs and long-term power purchase 
agreements (PPAs) until the available MW capacity designated for each batch of bidding has been allocated. 
The feed-in tariffs to developers are further complemented by support to power utilities by bundling solar 
power with conventionally produced electricity, which reduces the average per unit cost of solar power. An 
intermediary (the NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam, or NVVN) has been authorized in Phase 1 of the Solar 
Mission to bundle 1000 MW of grid-connected solar power with four times as much power from thermal 
power stations owned by NTPC (the National Thermal Power Corporation). Each unit of bundled power 
comprises one unit of solar power and four units of thermal power (which is much cheaper). The average cost 
of bundled power that the electricity utilities purchase from NVVN is, consequently, much lower than 
purchasing an individual unit of solar power directly from a solar project developer. 
In the first phase of the Mission (2010–12), the government deliberately kept the project sizes small (5 MW 
for the first round of bidding and 20 MW for the second) in order to open the market to a broad range of 
companies rather than lock in a few firms as dominant players at an early stage of the industry. Five MW was 
the limit per project and bidder for the first round of bidding; 20 MW was the limit per project and 50 MW 
per bidder for the second round (these limits were for solar PV projects). 
But one potential danger is that of overly aggressive bidding by inexperienced developers. If prices are 
driven too low and projects become financially unviable, then confidence in the Mission as a whole could 
become compromised. This risk has meant that reverse auctions have to be supported by thorough due 
diligence, along with larger deposits and penalties for non-performance (either timeliness of projects or 
amount of electricity generation). Project bidders are required to submit a bank guarantee (Rs.3 million per 
MW) at the time of signing the PPA, along with a ‘bid bond’ applicable per paise (100 paise = 1 rupee) of the 
discount that the bidder offers on the tariff approved by the regulator. If the project developer does not 
execute the project within the stipulated time period, the bank guarantees relating to the bid bond are 
encashed.  
Despite the cap on the MW allocation per project and bidder, cases have emerged where a few EPC 
(engineering, procurement, construction) contractors have secured contracts for executing projects that add 
up to much more than 5 MW. There have been accusations that large EPC contractors created front 
companies to bid for projects in order to corner a larger share of the market.  
Thorough due diligence and strict enforcement of performance benchmarks can ensure that inexperienced 
developers do not crowd out more expensive but viable projects, and that large companies are unable to use 
smaller players as a front to capture a large share of the market. 
Source: Council on Energy, Environment and Water; and Natural Resources Defense Council (2012). 
Oxford Energy & Environment Brief August 2012 
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B. Top-up instrument 
If the funder is going to resell credits from a direct purchase mechanism into a compliance market, the 
cost to the funder becomes the difference between the direct purchase price and the compliance 
market price. That is, they pay out the direct purchase price but then receive back the market price 
when they sell the credit into the market. 
Rather than the funder purchasing credits and reselling them, the vendor and funder can achieve the 
same outcome using top-up instruments. Top-up instruments oblige the funder to pay the vendor the 
difference between an agreed price and the prevailing carbon market price when the credits are 
delivered to market. This serves to ‘top up’ the revenue generated through the sale of reductions as 
credits/offsets into an existing market. If the prevailing market price exceeds the agreed-upon price 
when the vendor is ready to deliver the emissions reductions, the funder pays nothing, the funder’s 
obligation to the vendor ends, and the credits are simply delivered to market, as seen in design 
documents for the PMFF.  
Like the direct purchase agreement, top-up instruments can be allocated to potential vendors in a 
variety of ways. A reverse auction along the lines discussed for the direct purchase agreement can 
provide a cost-effective allocation. Or, the instruments can be distributed through some type of 
discretionary application and approval process. As with direct purchases, when criteria other than cost 
enter the decision, such a process is unlikely to deliver a transparent and cost-effective outcome (and 
if cost is the only criterion, it would be analogous to an auction).  
Unlike the direct purchase agreement, however, where there may or may not be a relationship to a 
specific carbon market, top-up instruments explicitly tie themselves to a market. The top-up 
instrument both ensures that the contracted reductions eventually enter that market, and links the top-
up payment to the price received by the vendor.
22
 
C. Tradable put options  
The previous two examples of QP instruments generally assume a straightforward process where (1) 
the funder conducts an allocation process, (2) those receiving a QP allocation undertake verified 
emissions reductions, and (3) payments are made based on delivery of those verified emissions 
reductions. For a variety of reasons, however, those receiving the QP allocation may be unable to 
fulfil the emissions reduction obligations they have promised. This raises the question: could such 
vendors (those in receipt of a QP allocation but unable to fulfil it) somehow transfer the allocation to 
another vendor to fulfil? 
The idea of a tradable put option provides a straightforward way in which this can happen. Using this 
approach, the funder creates tradable option contracts for vendors. The contract provides the vendor 
with the right, but not the obligation, to sell (in other words, a ‘put option’) to the funder a certain 
amount of reductions at a certain agreed price (‘strike price’) by a certain time (Müller 2008, Pizer 
2011). Importantly, these contracts can be bought and sold: if the current holder decides they are 
unlikely to use the contract, they can sell it to someone else who will use it. 
How does this work? At the moment an option is executed – when emissions reductions are delivered 
and payment is made by the funder – the value of the option equals the difference between strike price 
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 Note that the top-up approach, where the funder’s payment depends on the market price received by the 
vendor, raises issues about arm’s-length transactions if an official market price does not exist. See, for example, 
Bernard and Weiner (1990). 
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and the market price for verified emissions reductions. That is because the vendor could simply sell 
their emissions reductions in the market and receive the market price. In fact, if the market price is 
higher than the strike price, the vendor should sell the emissions reductions into the market, and the 
option contract will have zero value at that point. Otherwise, the value of the option to the vendor – 
that is, what the vendor would be willing to pay for the option contract – is the extra income from 
selling to the funder at the strike price specified in the option contract rather than selling to the 
market. 
If the option contract is executed and the funder buys the emissions reductions at the strike price, the 
put option looks like a direct purchase where the funder is actually acquiring the emissions reduction. 
Like a direct purchase, the funder then could retire the credit or sell it back into the market. However, 
like a top-up instrument, use of the instrument is linked to a market: if the market price is higher than 
the strike price, the vendor will sell the credits directly into the market, the contract will expire, and 
the funder will have no further obligation associated with that contract.
23
 
Unlike both the direct purchase and top-up instruments, however, the put option contract is 
transferable.
24
 Before the option is executed, even years before, the option still has value, but that 
value is related to expectations about the future credit price and its relation to the strike price in the 
put option contract. In the very early years, if a credit market and price has not emerged, the value of 
the put option will be the difference between the strike price and the cost of the emissions reductions. 
With enough people buying and selling these option contracts, a consensus about the value of these 
option contracts can also be determined by the market. 
This leads to an important distinction for put options from both the direct purchase and top-up 
instruments: in a limited sense, the cost-effectiveness of put options does not depend on how they are 
allocated. That is, put options will always flow towards the least expensive mitigation options 
regardless of how they are initially allocated. Suppose a put option with a strike price of $10 per tonne 
of emissions produced is in the hands of vendor A whose costs of reducing emissions are $9 per 
tonne. If another vendor B comes along whose costs are only $7 per tonne, that vendor would be 
willing to pay up to $3 for that put option (the selling price minus her costs). Since the option is only 
worth $1 to vendor A (the option’s selling price of $10 minus his costs of $9), there is room for a 
trade that makes both vendors better off.
25
 In this way, put options should migrate into the hands of 
those who can reduce emissions most cheaply at any point in time.
26
 While tradable put options will 
end up encouraging the lowest-cost reductions regardless of the allocation method, the cost to the 
funder will depend on the allocation method. In this sense, this general conclusion about the cost-
effectiveness of put options is ‘limited’ until we decide on an allocation method. The maximum cost 
to the funder of a put option is the strike price (per tonne) specified in the contract (multiplied by the 
number of tonnes covered by the contract). However, these put options immediately have market 
                                                     
23
 It would be a bit unusual for funders to retire the credit if the option is executed and do nothing if it is not 
executed. If retirement is the goal, a more sensible approach would be to specify that the funders would 
purchase and retire market credits in the case where the option is not executed.  
24
 There is no technical reason why direct purchase or top-up instruments could not be transferred. A tradable 
direct purchase instrument would look like a futures contract, while a tradable top-up instrument would be 
exactly the same as the put option. 
25
 This trade assumes that vendor A has not yet made his $9 investment. 
26
 As with all financial markets, and particularly a government-organized derivative market, it is important to 
ensure that outcomes are accomplished efficiently, fairly, and openly so as to reflect the forces of supply and 
demand. Concerns about price discovery, market transparency, optimal participation, and prevention of 
manipulation, fraud, and other abuses need to be addressed through adequate and appropriate market oversight. 
See, for example, Interagency (2011).   
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value because they can be resold. So, one allocation option is for the funder to sell these contracts. 
This revenue can then be used to finance more put options (or other activities), increasing cost-
effectiveness. If put options are sold through an auction, this will maximize cost-effectiveness. 
If the funder gives away these put options, or otherwise sells them at less than their market value, the 
recipients can (and, based on profit motives, should) re-sell the put options to the vendors with the 
lowest costs; that is, those who should be willing to pay the most for them. This creates an immediate 
profit for whoever receives an allocation either for free or at a price below what would occur in an 
auction. If they are not auctioned, the initial allocation of such option contracts is therefore more 
clearly a distributional issue.
27
 For example, the Green Climate Fund could provide National Funding 
Entities with free put options. These entities, in turn, might then auction the put options to vendors, 
raising funds for the national entities to pursue other activities.  
4. Evaluation of QP Instruments 
Each of these instruments will have advantages and disadvantages for various stakeholders. Given the 
nature of the transactions involved, some advantages to the one stakeholder will inevitably be 
disadvantages to another, and vice versa. 
Are they cost-effective? 
All QP instruments have the potential to be cost-effective, in terms of providing the maximum amount 
of verified emissions reductions for a given amount of public funds, if they are allocated through a 
competitive auction mechanism. The transferable put option can be cost-effective in a more limited 
sense without an auction: this instrument will encourage the cheapest available emissions reductions 
regardless of how the options are allocated, as the options are bought and sold in a secondary market. 
Without a competitive auction, however, some public funds will become transfers (or excess profit) to 
those receiving the options. Such transfers will probably exist when other QPs are allocated without 
an auction, but some public funds will also end up paying for higher priced emissions reductions. 
Do they require a carbon market? 
None of these instruments requires a carbon market, but both the top-up and put option instruments 
explicitly describe the potential for a market, have features tied to that market if it exists/emerges, and 
automatically deliver reductions to the market. A direct purchase instrument may or may not reference 
a market, and emissions reductions acquired with a direct purchase instrument may be retired or may 
be sold into the market. The top-up and put option instruments could also be coupled with a 
programme to purchase and retire credits, if that was desired. In this way, all of the QP instruments 
can be designed either to retire credits or sell them into a market.  
Table 1 highlights how the different instruments behave, both when a carbon market exists and prices 
are higher than the QP contracted price, and when either carbon markets do not exist or the market 
prices is below the contract price. With the exception of the direct purchase instrument, the amount 
received by the vendor is always the higher of the market or QP contract price. The direct purchase 
instrument always pays the contract price. Where the real difference occurs is whether the instrument 
                                                     
27
 Free allocation of QPs is generally a distributional question, as recipients are getting something, presumably 
valuable, for free that non-recipients are not getting. Transferable put option QPs, where there might well be a 
market price for reselling those options, makes that distributional feature even more transparent. 
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automatically delivers the contracted reductions to market, and whether the funder pays the full 
contract price or not. 
Table 1 Outcomes under various QP instruments and different market prices versus the QP 
contract price. 
 Market price > contract price No market or Market price < contract 
price  
 Fund pays Vendor 
receives 
Credits 
end up in 
market? 
Fund pays Vendor 
receives 
Credits 
end up in 
market? 





























































*In the put option variant, the fund also receives any proceeds from the initial sale of put options. With a competitive 
allocation mechanism, this should appear as a higher contract price compared to the top-up or direct purchase mechanism. 
 
Are purchased emissions reductions credits retired or sold into the market? 
As just noted, all three QP mechanisms can be used to retire emissions reduction credits or to sell 
them into the market. However, as Table 1 highlights, the three instruments differ in how they initially 
deliver the reductions and how much the funder pays. The direct purchase instrument more naturally 
lends itself to retirement, as the credits are purchased and will (by default) be retired unless 
subsequently an effort is made to sell them. By the same token, the cost to the funder is the full 
contract price, unless and until the reductions are sold into the market. The top-up instrument more 
naturally lends itself to selling into the market, as the funder initially pays just the difference between 
the specified top-up price and the market price to the instrument holder, who has just sold the 
emissions reduction into the market. Retirement would require the funder to purchase a credit from 
the market and then retire it.  
The put option remains in between these two instruments: if the option is executed by the vendor 
holding the put option (because the strike price exceeds the market price), the funder will be left 
holding the specified emissions reductions analogous to a direct purchase. If the option is not 
executed (because the strike price is below the market price), the contract expires and the funder holds 
no credits to retire unless he goes to the market and purchases them, analogous to the top-up 
instrument. 
Should emissions reductions be retired or sold into the market? Either choice serves to jump-start the 
market for emissions reductions. If that market emerges, retiring credits leads to more emissions 
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reductions; selling credits into the market frees up public funds for other climate-related purposes 
(which might include financing emissions reductions in other, non-market sectors). One’s preference 
for one or the other option therefore depends on the weight given to these different uses. 
In whose name is the reduction claimed? 
One key political question is: who gets recognition for the achieved emissions reductions? In theory, 
all three options would allow either contributing or beneficiary countries (or neither) to claim all or 
partial praise or merit for the resulting emissions reductions. This may, in part, depend on additional 
implementation details. 
If recognition is given, strictly bilateral funding systems will require a clear determination of how it 
would be shared between the two parties. In multilateral contexts, such as the Green Climate Fund, 
this would mean a determination of how such recognition is allocated among the relevant 
contributors.  
How well do they address non-performance? 
Non-performance occurs when a vendor has agreed to deliver verified emissions reductions in 
exchange for a specified payment, but fails to do so. As noted earlier, all QP instruments pay on 
delivery, so in the case of non-performance, no payment takes place and public funds remain available 
for other purposes. However, issuing the commitments to make QP payments will require public 
funds equal to the scale of the QP payments to be made available from the time of the commitment 
until payment is made or the commitment expires. Thus, non-performance will still imply that public 
money has been tied up for some period of time, and no reductions will have occurred. This will 
undoubtedly frustrate both funders and other vendors. Non-performance is well-documented
28
 in a 
variety of reverse auctions of direct purchase instruments for renewable power (see Box 1). 
Direct purchase and top-up instruments can address this kind of non-performance through more 
stringent participation criteria, bonding, or penalties for non-performance. However, these approaches 
can also deter participation. Transferable put options offer an alternative solution, creating incentives 
for non-performing vendors who hold such instruments to sell them to vendors who will perform. 
5. Implications for public-sector funders: The need for balance and adequacy 
When coupled with a competitive allocation, QP instruments can maximize achievable emissions 
reductions within the scope of eligible activities and using the public funding in question. A key 
prerequisite for cost-effectiveness is that the QP instrument will be able to attract as many potential 
project developers and investors as possible. It may be true that QP instruments organized by 
international agencies would be able to attract more international than domestic vendors, and vice 
versa for National Funding Entities. Both groups of vendors are key to the cost-effectiveness of QP 
instruments, suggesting the need for a careful balance in attracting international and national 
participants.   
It is also important to recognize that the drive for cost-effectiveness may lead to a ‘regional’ 
concentration of the funding flows, as happened in the case of the CDM. As mentioned above,
29
 this 
gave rise to strong criticism, particularly from developing countries that were left out (viz. African 
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 Wiser (2002); Council on Energy, Environment and Water, and Natural Resources Defense Council (2012). 
29
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and Least Developed Countries). One way in which such geographic imbalances could be addressed is 
to apply a two-tiered approach: allocate overall funds into geographical windows based on political 
criteria to achieve a desired geographic balance, then proceed to use QP instruments within each 
funding window. One would need to be careful, however, about carving up QP instruments into 
windows that are too small to attract sufficient private sector participation. Another way could be to 
keep a single ‘global’ QP window, and deal with the imbalances through other non-QP funding 
windows. 
Any approach will necessitate decisions on balancing overall cost-effectiveness with concerns about 
equity, particularly the kinds of concerns that have arisen already in the context of the CDM. Such 
equity concerns undoubtedly will be among the most difficult to work out.   
Another similarly difficult issue is how to ensure a adequate supply of public funding to be able to 
contract at the desired scale.
30, 31
 The one potential advantage of QP instruments in this arena is that 
they could increase confidence among contributing countries to provide more public funds upfront, in 
the knowledge that disbursements will occur only after emissions reductions have been delivered and 
verified.
32
   
These central issues of balancing cost-effectiveness, allocation, and adequacy of supply will have to 
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